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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Thomas timely appeals from the Judgment of Conviction in which he was
sentenced to a unified term of life, with twenty-five years fixed, following his conviction
for first-degree murder. Mr. Thomas asserts that the district court committed reversible
error in refusing to allow him to present the proffered testimony. After consideration of
the Respondent's Brief, the State has failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate
that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Thomas's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1)

Did the district court violate Mr. Thomas' constitutional right to present a defense
in a meaningful manner by refusing to allow him to present evidence that would
have supported his theory of the case?

2)

Did the district court err by excluding evidence and testimony from Jed Fischer,
Karey Cannon, and Laura Schumaker that Ms. Irby-Thomas engaged in
autoerotic asphyxia under the basis that the evidence was not relevant to the
determination of Mr. Thomas' guilt even though his defense was that Ms. IrbyThomas died while engaging in self autoerotic asphyxia?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Violated Mr. Thomas' Constitutional Right To Present A Defense In A
Meaningful Manner By Refusing To Allow Him To Present Evidence That Would Have
Supported His Theory Of The Case
The State's argument concerning the constitutional violation in this case was
limited solely to its claim that the district court properly suppressed the evidence under
the evidentiary rules. (Respondent's Brief pp.10-13.) Therefore, because the State's
argument about the constitutional violation is not remarkable, no further reply is
necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Thomas simply refers the Court back to pages 16-20 of his
Appellant's Brief. Mr. Thomas will address the district court's evidentiary error under the
evidentiary rules in Section II. Mr. Thomas will also provide further response on the
error not being harmless in Section IIC.

11.
The District Court Erred By Excluding Evidence And Testimony From Jed Fischer,
Karey Cannon, And Laura Schumaker That Ms. Irby-Thomas Engaged In Autoerotic
Asphyxia Under The Basis That The Evidence Was Not Relevant To The Determination
Of Mr. Thomas' Guilt Even Though His Defense Was That Ms. Irby-Thomas Died While
Engaging In Self Autoerotic Asphyxia
The State is incorrect in its argument that the proffered evidence was irrelevant
(See Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12) or that it was overly prejudicial (See Respondent's

Brief, pp.12-13).

Additionally, the State has failed to meet its burden of proof to

demonstrate that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Respondent's Brief pp. 14-16.)
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(See

A.

Jed Fischer, Karey Cannon, And Laura Schumaker Should Have Been Allowed
To Testify Because They Would Have Provided Relevant Information About
Ms. Irby-Thomas' Previous Sexual Behavior Which Was A Crucial Issue At Trial
The State appears to be arguing that the proffered testimony was irrelevant

because it involved evidence that Ms. Irby-Thomas enjoyed being asphyxiated by
another person without the use of "props." (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) The State's
argument is specious.
Evidentiary testimony was presented at trial from Dr. Gregory Wilson, an expert
in paraphilia, including erotic asphyxia.

(Tr., p.1185, L.22-p.1232, L.19.) Dr. Wilson

educated the jurors on the origin of the phrase autoerotic asphyxiation and the ongoing
understanding of the dangerous sexual practice.

(Tr., p.1205, L.3-p.1207, L.25.)

Researchers are just starting to understand this century-old aberrant sexual practice.
(Tr., p.1205, L.19-p.1206, L.14, p.1216, Ls.9-15.) The limited research indicates that
the practice of autoerotic asphyxiation affects a broad range of ages and both genders.
(Tr., p.1205, L.3-p.1207, L.25.) The goal of autoerotic asphyxia is to deplete oxygen
from the brain to heighten sexual arousal and sexualized experiences.

(Tr., p.1201,

Ls.23-25, p.1202, Ls.5-7.) It is unknown whether the increase of carbon dioxide or the
decrease of oxygen produces the desired result. (Tr., p.1203, Ls.13-15.)
Generally, participants obtain the desired asphyxiation by hanging, strangulation,
or suffocation. (Tr., p.1201, Ls.20-25.) The goal of strangulation for sexual pleasure is
to place pressure on the carotid artery to reduce the flow of oxygen. (Tr., p.1209, Ls.2025.) When participating self autoerotic asphyxiation, a self-rescue mechanism needs to
be used in order to prevent accidental death. (Tr., p.1211, Ls.16-20.)
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The State has placed too much emphasis on the devise used to obtain the goal
of strangulation for autoerotic asphyxia purposes.

Dr. Wilson did not provide any

testimony that "hands" could not be used as the method to reduce oxygen supply. (See
generally, Dr. Wilson's testimony.) Mr. Thomas submits that hands may be used, as
well as, a belt, tie, scarf, or other device to place pressure on the carotid artery to
reduce the flow of oxygen in order to gain sexual pleasure.
The precluded evidence was relevant to Mr. Thomas' defense. It was relevant to
explain how Ms. Irby-Thomas injured herself.

It was consistent with the testimony

provided by Mr. Thomas and was the question at issue before the jury. The district
court erred in failing to find the precluded evidence relevant.

B.

The Probative Value Outweighed The Prejudicial Effect
The district court determined that there was no relevance to the evidence and,

therefore, determined that the probative value was nonexistent. The State argues that
the prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value. (Respondent's Brief, pp.1213.) The State acknowledges that the jury was exposed to evidence about Ms. IrbyThomas' sexual proclivity.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.13.)

attempting to

between

distinguish

The State appears to be

self autoerotic asphyxiation

and

autoerotic

asphyxiation with a partner and, therefore, argues that the evidence is derogatory to
Ms.Irby-Thomas.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.)

The district court erred in its

balancing test because the evidence was relevant and its probative value outweighed
any prejudicial effect.
The probative value of the proffered evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect.
I.R.E. 403 states that "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
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value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... " I.R.E. 403.
When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not
outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. State v.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993). I.R.E. 403 creates a balancing test. On one
hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of the proffered evidence by
focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the need
for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107
(1987). At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the
evidence amounts to unfair prejudice. Id.
To some extent, all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho
83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989). Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the
district court if, inter alia, the probative value of that evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of
misleading the jury, or if the evidence would involve needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249,254 (1995).
In the instant case as explained above, the evidence was relevant to
Mr. Thomas' defense and relevant to an ultimate issue in controversy, i.e., whether
Ms. Irby-Thomas injured herself engaging in a dangerous sexual practice.

The

admission of that evidence has minimal prejudicial impact. The jurors were exposed to
the aberrant sexual practice; it was Mr. Thomas' defense. An expert testified about the
aberrant sexual practice. (Tr., p.1185, L.17-p.1232, L.19.) Mr. Thomas testified about
Ms. Irby-Thomas' aberrant sexual practices.

(See generally Tr., p.859, L.12-p.1013,

L.21.) The evidence would not have confused the jurors. The evidence would have
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only supported what Mr. Thomas was already trying to explain to them. The district
court erred in excluding the evidence.

C.

The Error Was Not Harmless
The appropriate standard for determining whether an objected-to error was

harmless was clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
222 (2010). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

Perry,

150 Idaho at 227. To meet that burden, the State must "prove[] 'beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Id. at 221
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
In interpreting Chapman, the United States Supreme Court has explained that:
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial
later held to have been erroneous . . . To say that an error did not
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as
revealed in the record.
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds by
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991). Thus, the inquiry of an appellate court

"is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was
surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
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In its analysis, the State makes quick mention of the error, i.e., "In this case, the
ample evidence of Thomas's guilty supports beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have returned a guilty verdict even if Fischer, Cannon, and Schumaker had been
allowed to testify." (Respondent's Brief, p.14) The State then continues its analysis
under the application that overwhelming evidence existed to support the verdict.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.14-16.) The State never acknowledges what contribution the
erroneously excluded evidence would have had on the trial had it been admitted. (See
Respondent's Brief, pp.14-16.) In this case, the State failed to meet the burden that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) and the
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-220 (2010).
This error was not "unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered
on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." See Yates, 500 U.S. at 403. The
jury asked, "Did anyone other than Joe lay foundation that Beth was, in fact, into
autoerotic asphyxiation?" (Tr., p.1368, Ls.13-15.) The jury found it important enough to
ask the question about the evidence that could have answered their question had it
been admitted. (Tr., p.1368, Ls.9-20.) The jury question went to an ultimate question in
controversy, whether to believe Mr. Thomas in that he did not kill Ms. Irby-Thomas but,
instead, she injured herself. The jurors were weighing in on Mr. Thomas' credibility and
the admitted evidence would have assisted the jurors in making their decision.
The precluded evidence was relevant to Mr. Thomas' defense. It was relevant to
explain how Ms. Irby-Thomas injured herself.

It was consistent with the testimony

provided by Mr. Thomas and was the question at issue before the jury. The failure to
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admit the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Perry, 150

Idaho at 227, See also, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Thomas respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Judgment of Conviction and
remand the matter for a new trial.
DATED this 1ih day of September, 2013.

DIANE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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